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I. INTRODUCTION

II. TYPES OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
While recent developments in technology have continued to create new conversation
and controversy about child pornography, the existence of child pornography predates
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1. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
2. MONIQUE MATTEI FERRARO & EOGHAN CASEY, INVESTIGATING CHILD EXPLOITATION AND
PORNOGRAPHY: THE INTERNET, THE LAW AND FORENSIC SCIENCE 237 (2005).
3. CARMEN M. CUSACK, PORNOGRAPHY AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 188 (2015).
4. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 242 (2002).
5. See generally OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1024.1(A).
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5HIHUULQJWRSRUQRJUDSK\6XSUHPH&RXUW-XVWLFH3RWWHU6WHZDUWIDPRXVO\ZURWH³,
NQRZLWZKHQ,VHHLW´1 However, the current struggle to define child pornography in our
technologically-DGYDQFHG DJH GHPRQVWUDWHV WKDW 6WHZDUW¶V DELOLW\ LQ  WR LGHQWLI\
pornography with a glance is not a viable option for defining child pornography today. 2
This comment tracks the development of child pornography law, specifically focusing on
morphed child pornography and Oklahoma law. Morphed child pornography is distinct
from images of children engaging in sexual acts, or depictions of virtual children engaging
in sexual acts.3 Rather, morphed child pornography consists of otherwise innocent images
of real children edited to appear as though the child is engaged in a sexual act.4 Ultimately,
WKLV FRPPHQW DUJXHV WKDW 2NODKRPD¶V OHJDO GHILQLWLRQ RI FKLOG SRUQRJUDSK\ VKRXOG EH
updated to include morphed child pornography thereby protecting the children that are
exploited in these types of images.5
Part II provides a brief overview of the history of child pornography. This section
provides the context necessary to understand the interactions between the multifaceted
definitions of child pornography and the law. Specifically, this part defines morphed child
pornography by comparing and contrasting morphed child pornography with other
categorical definitions, including virtual child pornography and lewd child pornography.
Part III explains the interaction of child pornography and the law in the United
States, both at the federal and state level. The evolution of obscenity laws is tracked along
with its relationship to child pornography law. The interaction of child pornography law
and the First Amendment is discussed.
3DUW ,9 LQWHUSUHWV 2NODKRPD¶V VWDWXWH GHILQLQJ FKLOG SRUQRJUDSK\ DQDO\]LQJ
whether or not the morphed variety legally constitutes child pornography. It utilizes
different tools of statutory construction to answer this question, looking at the legislative
intent behind this section in the criminal code and the plain meaning of the words in the
statute. This part also addresses the treatment of child pornography at the state level, noting
the different statutory definitions of child pornography and whether morphed child
pornography is included in those definitions.
Part V argues that morphed child pornography should fall within any definition of
child pornography. After addressing the harms and exploitation caused by morphed
images, this part concludes that morphed child pornography should be included in
2NODKRPD¶VVWDWXWRU\GHILQLWLRQRIFKLOGSRUQRJUDSK\)LQDOO\LWUHFRPPHQGVWKHVLPSOH
language needed to broaden OklahomD¶VVWDWXWRU\GHILQLWLRQRIFKLOGSRUQRJUDSK\
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even the invention of the printing press in the fifteenth century. 6 For example, paintings
depicting sexual activity between men and young boys have been discovered in ancient
Greek civilizations.7 In addition, written pornography describing sexual acts with children
has survived from seventeenth-century France and England.8 Indeed, it has been said that
³>D@OPRVWVLQFH PDQGLVFRYHUHGWKHDELOLW\ WR ZULWHRUGUDZ KH KDVUHFRUGHGWKHVH[XDO
DEXVHRIFKLOGUHQ´9
Advancements in technology have greatly increased the production and distribution
of child pornography. With the invention of the camera in the early nineteenth century, the
pornography industry boomed, and with it, child pornography. 10 The relationship between
technology and pornography continues today. Significant changes in technology can shift
the creation and distribution of child pornography in a matter of years. 11 Rapid
advancement in technology led to a proliferation of child pornography. 12 These
GHYHORSPHQWVFUHDWHGZKDWKDVEHHQGHVFULEHGDVD³FKLOGSRUQRJUDSK\UHYROXWLRQ´DQG
created a context in which defining child pornography is a challenging task. 13
A. The Difficulty of Defining Child Pornography
For a number of reasons, including advancements in technology, a succinct and clear
definition of child pornRJUDSK\ LVHOXVLYH-XVWLFH 6WHZDUW¶VQRQ-descript diagnosis is a
poor default.14 Attempting to define child pornography while considering all the resulting
implications is a muddy task. Accordingly, the challenges of defining child pornography
were highlighted at the First World Congress Against the Commercial Sexual Exploitation
of Children:

As the above quote illustrates, questions remain regarding the type of image that
constitutes child pornography. 16 Subtle differences among statutory definitions within the
United States provide more evidence of this challenge.17 Ultimately, advancements in

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
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IAN O¶DONNELL & CLAIRE MILNER, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY: CRIME, COMPUTERS AND SOCIETY 3 (2007).
Id.
Id.
TIM TATE, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY: AN INVESTIGATION 33±34 (1990).
O¶DONNELL & MILNER, supra note 6, at 4.
Carissa Byrne Hessick, Introduction, in REFINING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAW: CRIME, LANGUAGE, AND
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 1, 1 (Carissa Byrne Hessick ed., 2016).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
15. O¶DONNELL & MILNER, supra note 6, at 65.
16. Hessick, supra note 11, at 1.
17. Compare OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1024.1(A) (³[E]ngaged in any act . . . of sexual intercourse . . . ´), CAL.
PENAL CODE § 311.11(a) (³[D]epicts a person under 18 years of age personally engaging in or simulating sexual
conduct . . . ´), and FLA. STAT. § 827.071(5) (³[I]nclude any sexual conduct by a child.´), with 18 U.S.C. §
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The question of what constitutes child pornography is extraordinarily complex. Standards
that are applied in each society or country are highly subjective and are contingent upon
different moral, cultural, sexual, social and religious beliefs that do not readily translate into
law. Even if we confine ourselves to a legal definition of child pornography, the concept is
elusive. Legal definitions of . . ³FKLOGSRUQRJUDSK\´GLIIHUJOREDOO\ DQGPD\GLIIHUHYHQ
among legal jurisdictions within the same country. 15
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technology spur unique and creative ways to accomplish the seediest of tasks and,
accordingly, require state legislatures to continually develop the law. Because each
MXULVGLFWLRQFUDIWVLWVRZQGHILQLWLRQRI³FKLOGSRUQRJUDSK\´HDFKMXULVGLFWLRQPXVWDOVR
make sure its definition continues to encompass the types of child pornography that fall
within the safety of legal loopholes created by technology, the internet, and computers.18
While there might be differences in the many legal definitions, there is a common
understanding about some core principles. Perhaps Justice Stewart was expressing this
commonality, and not the technical challenges, when offering his description.
Pornography was first defined in 1857 in the Oxford English Dictionary.19 The depiction
of sex and sexual activities is at the center. 20 An overly simplistic definition of child
SRUQRJUDSK\LV³DQLPDJHWKDWGHSLFWVDFOHDUO\SUHSXEHVFHQWKXPDQEHLQJin a sexually
H[SOLFLW PDQQHU´21 Pornography is generally thought to be a depiction of consensual
sex.22 This view provides the great dividing line between pornography and child
pornography. All fifty states and the federal government have laws establishing an age of
consent for sexual activity.23 Therefore, because children lack the capacity to consent to
sexual activities, an image showing sexual acts involving a child is by definition an image
of child abuse.24 This element of consent provides an explanatioQ DV WR ZK\ ³>P@RVW
definitions of child pornography are premised on the basis of the harm that is caused to
WKHFKLOGLQWKHSURGXFWLRQRIFKLOGSRUQRJUDSK\´ 25
As a result, an image of a child engaging in sexual acts falls within the definition of
child pornography in all fifty state jurisdictions and the federal law. 26 The current debate
regarding the definition of child pornography is not focused on these images of traditional
child pornography. Not only is this type of child pornography clearly included in any
possible definition, it is the type of child pornography possessed by most offenders. 27 A

03/03/2020 13:59:43
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2256(8)(C) (³[S]uch visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to appear that an identifiable minor
is engaging in sexually explicit conduct.´).
18. FERRARO & CASEY, supra note 2, at 8.
19. Id.
20. MAX TAYLOR & ETHEL QUAYLE, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY: AN INTERNET CRIME 22 (2003).
21. FERRARO & CASEY, supra note 2, at 8.
22. ALISDAIR A. GILLESPIE, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY: LAW AND POLICY 2, 22 (2011).
23. MacKenzie Smith, Note, You Can Touch, But You Can’t Look: Examining the Inconsistencies of Our Age
of Consent and Child Pornography Law, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 859, 863 (2014).
24. GILLESPIE, supra note 22, at 22. The North American Man/Boy Love Association (NAMBLA) is an
example of an organization that rejects this basic premise, stating that its ³goal is to end the extreme oppression
of men and boys in mutually consensual relationships by . . . educating the general public on the benevolent
nature of man/boy love.´ NAMBLA, Who We Are, https://www.nambla.org/welcome.html (last visited Oct. 27,
2018).
25. GILLESPIE, supra note 22, at 22.
26. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1024.1(A) (³[E]ngaged in any act . . . of sexual intercourse . . . ´); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 311.11(a) (³[D]epicts a person under 18 years of age personally engaging in simulating sexual conduct
. . . ´); FLA. STAT. § 827.071(5) (³[I]nclude any sexual conduct by a child.´); 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C) (³[S]uch
visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually
explicit conduct.´); see also Smith, supra note 23, at 864; Nat¶l Ctr. for the Prevention of Child Abuse, Child
Pornography Statutes, NAT¶L DIST. ATT¶Y¶S ASS¶N (June 2010), https://ndaa.org/wp-content/uploads/ChildPornography-Statutory-Compilation-62010.pdf?click=Child%20Pornography%20%E2%80%94%20Comprehensive%20(updated%20June%202010).
27. JANIS WOLAK, KIMBERLY MITCHELL & DAVID FINKELHOR, INTERNET SEX CRIMES AGAINST MINORS:
THE RESPONSE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 9±10 (2003).
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2003 study determined that eighty percent of offenders had images of children being
sexually penetrated.28
&HUWDLQO\DQ\LPDJHRIDFKLOG³HQJDJLQJ´LQVH[SUHFisely fits within the definition,
not only in official statutes, but also in the minds of those who agree with Justice Stewart.
However, there are images of children that do not fit perfectly into this bright-line
GHILQLWLRQ RI FKLOGUHQ ³HQJDJLQJ´ LQ VH[ Beyond the traditional understanding of child
pornography, three other categories will help to clarify the complexity of this issue.
B. Lewd Exhibition
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28. Id. at 10.
29. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1024.1(A) (³[L]ewd exhibition of uncovered genitals . . . ´); 18 U.S.C.
§ 2256(2)(A)(v) (³[L]ascivious exhibition of the anus, genitals, or pubic area . . . ´).
30. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1024.1(A); 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A)(v).
31. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1024.1(A).
32. See, e.g., LYNN POWELL, FRAMING INNOCENCE: A MOTHER¶S PHOTOGRAPHS, A PROSECUTOR¶S ZEAL,
AND A SMALL TOWN¶S RESPONSE 20±21 (2010) (telling the story of a mother who was prosecuted for taking
photos of her bathing daughter).
33. Amy Adler, The “Dost Test” in Child Pornography Law, in REFINING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAW:
CRIME, LANGUAGE, AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 81, 86 (Carissa Byrne Hessick ed., 2016).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 87.
37. United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, 832 (S.D. Cal. 2011).
38. Adler, supra note 33, at 99.
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%RWKWKHIHGHUDODQGVWDWHVWDWXWHVKDYHHOHPHQWVWKDWLQFOXGHWKH³OHZGH[KLELWLRQ´
RIFKLOGUHQ¶VJHQLWals.29 In these instances, it is not required that there be a depiction of a
sex act, but mere child nudity.30 Therefore, lewd images, while not specifically images of
FKLOGUHQ ³HQJDJLQJ´ LQ VH[XDO FRQGXFW GR ILW LQWR FRPPRQ GHILQLWLRQV RI FKLOG
pornography. For example, Oklahoma law states that child pornography includes the
³OHZG H[KLELWLRQ RI XQFRYHUHG JHQLWDOV´31 The reason to include this type of image is
obvious: the elements of consent are equally applied to an image of a child who cannot
consent to engaging in sex or cannot consent to taking off their clothes and exposing their
body in order to sexually stimulate the viewer.
However, apparently innocent family photos might include pictures of partially
clothed or naked children in a bathtub or other family contexts. In fact, this definition has
led to the prosecution of parents who have taken photos of their children in bathtubs. 32
6RPH HYHQ DUJXH WKDW WKLV LV WKH ³PRVW SUREOHPDWLF DVSHFW RI GHILQLQJ FKLOG
SRUQRJUDSK\´33 'HWHUPLQLQJ WKH GLIIHUHQFH EHWZHHQ D ³ODVFLYLRXV H[KLELWLRQ RI WKH
JHQLWDOV´DQGDQLQQRFHQWIDPLO\SKRWRJUDSKRIDQDNHGFKLOGLQDEDWKWXELVDSRWHQWLDOO\
difficult task.34 It is certainly more difficult than determining whether a photo displays a
child being sexually assaulted.35 The Dost test was developed to help answer these
questions.36 The Dost test lists several factors that assist a court in determining whether or
QRWDQLPDJHLVD³ODVFLYLRXVH[KLELWLRQ´RIFKLOGQXGLW\ 37
While some have argued that this test is overbroad and therefore unconstitutional,
the breadth of this particular branch in most child pornography definitions remains
flexible.38 This particular type of child pornography interacts with technology because
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photoshopping and cropping can be a factor in determining whether a particular photo
qualifies as a lewd exhibition of nudity. 39 In other words, photo editing might be the
difference between an innocent family photo and child pornography. 40
C. Virtual
Virtual child pornography is dissimilar to the other types because it is neither a photo
RI DQ DFWXDO FKLOG HQJDJLQJ LQ VH[ QRU DQ DFWXDO FKLOG¶V QDNHG JHQLWDOV 41 Rather than
utilizing a real child, some pornographic images are completely computer generated or
utilize adults depicted as minors.42 Increasingly realistic images are more prolific because
of advancing technology.43 ³7KHVHLPDJHVDUHLQHVVHQFHILFWLWLRXVFKLOGSRUQRJUDSK\
EHFDXVHDJHQXLQHFKLOG>ZDV@QHYHULQYROYHG´44
This type of imagery is common in Japan, where comic books (manga) are
popular.45 A specific variety of manga that includes the most graphic content is known as
hentai.46 These artistic drawings or computer-generated images show children engaging
in sex and sexual activity. However, the content was not created with the use of a child,
leading to the creation of a different category of child pornography.
D. Morphed
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39. See State v. Bolles, 541 S.W.3d 128, 144 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).
40. See generally id.
41. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 239 (2002).
42. Chelsea McLean, Note, The Uncertain Fate of Virtual Child Pornography Legislation, 17 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL¶Y 221, 224 (2007).
43. Id. at 223.
44. GILLESPIE, supra note 22, at 100.
45. O¶DONNELL & MILNER, supra note 6, at 66.
46. Id.
47. The word ³morphed´ is not the only term used to describe the types of manipulated images described
here. Other commentators use the labels ³spliced´ or ³rendered.´ See GILLESPIE, supra note 22, at 100. ³Pseudoimages´ is another label. See SUZANNE OST, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND SEXUAL GROOMING: LEGAL AND
SOCIETAL RESPONSES 124 (2009). However, ³morphed´ is the term commonly used and adopted by the Supreme
Court and circuit courts. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 242 (2002); United States v.
Hotaling, 634 F.3d 725, 729±30 (2nd Cir. 2011); United States v. Bach, 400 F.3d 622, 630 (8th Cir. 2005) .
48. FERRARO & CASEY, supra note 2, at 237; Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 242.
49. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 242.
50. FERRARO & CASEY, supra note 2, at 237.
51. Id.
52. Id.

42010-tul_55-2 Sheet No. 84 Side B

Morphed47 child pornography is created when an innocent photo of an actual child
is edited to make it appear as though the child is engaging in a sexual act.48 It is the cutting
and pasting of body parts²bringing together innocent and explicit images²that
constitutes this unique type of child pornography. 49 The method of morphing can be
accomplished through a variety of means ranging from rudimentary scissors and glue to
sophisticated computer editing programs.50 The distinction between virtual and morphed
child pornography, while both employ technology to create or edit images, is important to
understand these categories. The use of an actual child is the paramount difference.51
Morphed child pornography is created by combining a variety of components. 52
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III. CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND THE LAW
This Part addresses the interaction between child pornography and the law. Focusing
first on the federal level, it explores the relationship between child pornography, obscenity,
and the First Amendment, providing a necessary foundation for a discussion of the recent
FDVHVWKDWWDFNOHGPRUSKHGFKLOGSRUQRJUDSK\$GLVFXVVLRQRIWKHFLUFXLWFRXUWV¶WUHDWPHQW
of morphed child pornography follows.
A. Early Developments
While child pornography might have ancient origins, laws against child pornography
Id.
Id.
FERRARO & CASEY, supra note 2, at 238.
Id. at 237.
Id.; TAYLOR & QUAYLE, supra note 20, at 37.
O¶DONNELL & MILNER, supra note 6, at 91.
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53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
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Images of real children can be taken from virtually any source; the internet, magazines,
etc. These photos of real children can then be edited to depict children engaging in sexual
acts or situations. Some of these images can be made with photoshop or practically any
other editing software. 53 This is a different level of photo editing than the common social
media filters on Instagram or Snapchat. Rather than changing the shade of colors or
incorporating a fictional face, morphed child pornography slices and splices the photos
until the images reveal actual children appearing to engage in sex. Morphed child
pornography does not polish or tone photos of children, but rather edits photos together to
create a single explicit photo.
The following are two common examples of morphed child pornography. First,
consider a photo of a child innocently eating an ice cream cone. The child is not engaging
in sex or showing their exposed genitals. However, a pornographer can take that photo and
edit it significantly, replacing the ice cream cone by superimposing a photo of an actual
penis in place of the ice cream cone. Now, post-production, the child appears to be
engaging in a sex act.54
Second, consider a photo of an innocent child. That photo is cropped to consist of
only the face of the child. Next, the pornographer places that cropped image on the body
of a pornographic photo of a naked adult. Certainly, the child was not engaging in sexual
acts at the time the innocent photo was taken, but now the image of the child shows a
depiction of a sexual act committed upon a child. 55
Morphed child pornography is dissimilar to both virtual and traditional child
pornography. It is divergent from traditional child pornography because no child was
engaged in sexual activity even though the photo is altered to depict such acts. 56 It is
distinct from virtual child pornography because a real child is the subject of the
SRUQRJUDSKHU¶V LPDJH²and presumably²pleasure.57 However, advancements in the
technology facilitating life-like photo edits will confuse this distinction. 58 With the blur
between the different categories of child pornography, jurisdictions must define child
pornography with precision.
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are relatively recent.59 California was the first state to pass a law prohibiting individuals
from using a minor in connection with the preparation or distribution of obscene matter in
1961.60 But it took nearly ten years to expand awareness of child pornography. The 1970s
was a notable decade for the expansion not only of child pornography, awareness of child
pornography, and child sexual abuse, but also of laws prohibiting child pornography. 61
Some believe that the first real awareness of child pornography came in September 1975
in New York City during the preparation for the 1976 Democratic Convention. 62 The
administration started a clean-up campaign targeting sex shops; four shops in particular
were known to sell child pornography. 63 Because of the media attention on the
Convention, the issue of child pornography was spotlighted.64
The media focus on child pornography in the latter half of the 1970s snowballed. In
1977, the Chicago Tribune SXEOLVKHGDVHULHVRIVWRULHVRQ³FKLOGSUHGDWRUV´65 The New
York Times printed twenty-seven articles focused on child exploitation in 1977.66 On May
15, 1977, CBS news program 60 Minutes DLUHGDQHSLVRGH ZLWKDUHSRUWWLWOHG ³.LGGLH
3RUQ´WKDWVSXUUHGDWLGDOZDYHRIOHWWHUVWRSROLWLFLDQV 67 It is no surprise that one member
RI&RQJUHVVLQVWDWHG³$\HDUDJRZKRKDGHYHUKHDUGRIFKLOGSRUQRJUDSK\>"@ . .
All of a sudden there it was. In newspapers, in Time magazine, on television, and
inevitably, on the House floor. The revelations were shocking and disgusting. Children,
DJHVWREHLQJXVHGVROGWUDGHGSKRWRJUDSKHGIRUVH[XDOSXUSRVHV´ 68
In 1978, Congress enacted a new federal statute, the Protection of Children Against
Sexual Exploitation.69 This new law banned the use of children in the production of child
pornography connected to interstate or foreign commerce. 70 Before the statute was passed
it was possible to purchase more than 250 different child pornography magazines in the
United States.71 While more than four decades of legal development have passed since
WKDW WLPH ³WKH ODZ VXUURXQGLQJ FKLOG SRUQRJUDSK\ LV IDU IURP VHWWOHG´ HVSHFLDOO\ DV LW
relates to morphed child pornography. 72

Ordinarily, the First Amendment provides protection for speech. 73 However, the
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59. Hessick, supra note 11, at 2.
60. Id.
61. O¶DONNELL & MILNER, supra note 6, at 15.
62. Id. at 16.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Hessick, supra note 11, at 3.
66. O¶DONNELL & MILNER, supra note 6, at 17.
67. Id.
68. Hessick, supra note 11, at 3.
69. Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No 95-225, 92 Stat. 7 (1978)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2251).
70. Id.
71. JOHN CREWDSON, BY SILENCE BETRAYED: SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN IN AMERICA 243 (1988).
72. Hessick, supra note 11, at 1.
73. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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Supreme Court has created exceptions for obscenity and child pornography. 74 The
obscenity exception predates that of child pornography. 75 Obscenity is not identical to
SRUQRJUDSK\DQG-XVWLFH6WHZDUW¶VVWDWHPHQWVLQGicate the distinction is not robust.76 The
&RXUWHYHQFDOOVWKHGLYLGHEHWZHHQZKDWLVFRQVWLWXWLRQDOO\SURWHFWHGDQGREVFHQLW\D³GLP
DQGXQFHUWDLQOLQH´77 The rudimentary test as applied by the Jacobellis &RXUWLV³ZKHWKHU
to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme
RIWKHPDWHULDOWDNHQDVDZKROHDSSHDOVWRSUXULHQWLQWHUHVW´78 The Supreme Court refined
its definition of unprotected obscenity in Miller v. California. The Miller Court concluded
WKDWWKH³EDVLFJXLGHOLQHV´WRGHWHUPLQHREVFHQLW\LQFOXGHGWKHIROORZLQJWKUHHIDFWRUV
D  >:@KHWKHU ³WKH DYHUDJH SHUVRQ DSSO\LQJ FRQWHPSRUDU\ FRPPXQLW\ VWDQGDUGV´ ZRXOG
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest[;] . . . (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined
by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.79
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74. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 492 (1957); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756 (1982).
75. Roth, decided in 1957, preceded Ferber, decided in 1982, by twenty-five years.
76. Roth, 354 U.S. at 487.
77. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 187 (1964).
78. Id. at 191.
79. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1972) (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972)).
80. James Weinstein, The Context and Content of New York v. Ferber, in REFINING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
LAW: CRIME, LANGUAGE, AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 19, 24 (Carissa Byrne Hessick ed., 2016).
81. Id.
82. Id. (stating that ³(1) twelve states prohibited only the production of child pornography; (2) fifteen states
and the federal government prohibited the distribution of material depicting children engaged in sexual conduct
but only if the material also met the Miller standard for obscenity; and (3) twenty states, including New York,
prohibited distribution of child pornography if it was not legally obscene´).
83. Hessick, supra note 11, at 3.
84. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969).
85. Hessick, supra note 11, at 3±4; see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 749±50 (1982).
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However, at the time of Miller, the Supreme Court had not yet addressed child
SRUQRJUDSK\ QRU FRQVLGHUHG LW DQ H[FHSWLRQ WR WKH )LUVW $PHQGPHQW 0RUHRYHU ³WKH
LQGXVWU\GHYRWHGWRSURGXFWLRQDQGGLVWULEXWLRQRIFKLOGSRUQRJUDSK\ZDVIORXULVKLQJ´ 80
Some commentators believe this resulted from the weighty protection applied to speech
by the Supreme Court during this time. 81 This changed in 1982, ten years after Miller.
Perhaps as a response to the substantial media attention to the issues of child exploitation
and child pornography, there was a massive legislative response.82 States began to ban
child pornography within the current obscenity framework, not wanting to push past the
established obscenity exception to the First Amendment. 83 However, it is important to
note that mere possession of obscene materials is protected by the First Amendment.84 In
other words, states targeting child pornography as obscenity could not ban child
pornography possession. That is, until states like New York made the legal distinction
between child pornography and obscenity.
New York distinguished between child pornography and obscenity by adopting a
statute that criminalized the production and distribution of child pornography, separate
from a statute criminalizing the distribution of obscene material.85 This differentiation was
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86. Weinstein, supra note 80, at 19 (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756).
87. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 753.
88. Id. at 756 (³[L]aws directed at the dissemination of child pornography run the risk of suppressing
protected expression by allowing the hand of the censor to become unduly heavy.´).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 758.
91. Id. at 759.
92. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759.
93. Id. at 761.
94. Id. at 762.
95. Id. at 756, 759.
96. Id. at 764.
97. Ferber, 485 U.S. at 764.
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the catalyst for the Supreme Court to consider whether or not child pornography, separate
from the obscenity exception, is protected by the First Amendment.
In New York v. Ferber, the Supreme Court held that child pornography, depictions
of DFWXDO FKLOGUHQ HQJDJHG LQ H[SOLFLW VH[XDO FRQGXFW LV ³FDWHJRULFDOO\ GHYRLG RI )LUVW
$PHQGPHQWSURWHFWLRQ´86 Ferber ZDVWKHILUVW6XSUHPH&RXUWFDVHWRH[DPLQHD³VWDWXWH
GLUHFWHGDWDQGOLPLWHGWRGHSLFWLRQVRIVH[XDODFWLYLW\LQYROYLQJFKLOGUHQ´ 87 The Court
cautiously stated its natural hesitancy to promote censorship. 88 However, the Court
ultimately rejected the Miller test to evaluate the constitutionality of child pornography
ODZVDQGQRWHGWKDW³6WDWHVDUHHQWLWOHGWRJUHDWHUOHHZD\LQWKHUHJXODWLRQ of pornographic
GHSLFWLRQVRIFKLOGUHQ´89 The Ferber Court essentially drew a line in the sand, carving a
category for child pornography distinct from obscenity. This was clearly a defining
moment in the relationship between child pornography and the law. Rather than use the
traditional obscenity exception to the First Amendment, the Court created a new exception
to the First Amendment for this type of material.
The Ferber Court listed several reasons for stripping First Amendment protections
from child pornography. First, the Court reasoned that the use of children in pornography
³LVKDUPIXOWRWKHSK\VLRORJLFDOHPRWLRQDODQGPHQWDOKHDOWK´RIFKLOGUHQ 90 Second, the
distribution of such images is related to the sexual abuse of children. 91 The images are a
permanent record²and exacerbator²of the harm experienced.92 Third, the distribution,
DGYHUWLVLQJ DQG VHOOLQJ RI FKLOG SRUQRJUDSK\ DUH ³DQ LQWHJUDO SDUW RI WKH SURGXFWLRQ RI
>FKLOGSRUQRJUDSK\@´93 )RXUWKWKHYDOXHRIFKLOGSRUQRJUDSK\LVH[WUHPHO\ORZ³Lf not
de minimis´94 The Court therefore justified the exclusion of child pornography from the
protections of the First Amendment as a unique class of materials because of its express
connection to the harming of children. 95
The Ferber Court also provided specific guidelines for child pornography laws.
6WDWHVPXVWDGHTXDWHO\GHILQHWKHFRQGXFWWREHSURKLELWHG7KHZRUGV³VH[XDOFRQGXFW´
must be described and defined.96 However, because the Miller test does not apply to child
pornography WKH VH[XDO FRQGXFW QHHG QRW PHHW WKH REVFHQLW\ VWDQGDUG RI ³SDWHQWO\
RIIHQVLYH´97 Even with these limited instructions, the Court did something remarkable in
First Amendment jurisprudence by creating a category exempt from the First Amendment
based on a harm-in-production theory. In other words, child pornography is unprotected
by the Constitution because of the harm caused to children during the creation of child

42010-tul_55-2 Sheet No. 87 Side A

03/03/2020 13:59:43

BEACHAM, C - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

2/18/2020 6:57 AM

METAMORPHOSIS

321

pornography and subsequent distribution.98 Notice that this harm is not explicitly linked
to a lack of consent by minor children in sexual activities, but it is obviously central to its
foundation.
Ferber¶VDWWDFNRQWKHSURGXFWLRQDQGGLVWULEXWLRQRIFKLOGSRUQRJUDSK\ZDVIXUWKHU
expanded in Osborne v. Ohio. In Osborne, the Supreme Court held that Ohio could
prohibit the possession of child pornography. 99 Because possession of obscene material is
not illegal,100 this holding provides another distinction between obscene materials and
child pornography. While it would be paternalistic to prohibit the viewing of obscene
PDWHULDO GHQ\LQJ WKH ULJKW WR YLHZ FKLOG SRUQRJUDSK\ SURWHFWV WKH ³SK\VLFDO DQG
psychological well-being of . . PLQRU>V@´101 Therefore, the Court utilized the harm-inproduction logic of Ferber to ban possession of child pornography.
C. The CPPA: Congress’ Attempt to Ban Virtual and Morphed Child Pornography
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98. Id. at 758±59.
99. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990).
100. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969).
101. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109.
102. YAMAN AKDENIZ, INTERNET CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND THE LAW: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSES 97 (2008).
103. Free Speech Coal. v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1999).
104. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2256); Brian Yamada, Note, Pornoshopped: Why California Should Adopt the Federal
Standard for Child Pornography, 32 L.A. ENT. L. REV. 229, 232 (2011).
105. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (including virtual child pornography); 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C) (including
morphed child pornography).
106. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 240 (2002).
107. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (emphasis added).
108. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 256.
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Before 1996, both virtual and morphed child pornography were left unaddressed by
federal law.102 'XULQJ WKLV WLPH ³WKH DFWXDO SDUWLFLSDWLRQ DQG DEXVH RI FKLOGUHQ LQ WKH
production or dissemination of pornography involving minors was the sine qua non of the
UHJXODWLQJVFKHPH´103 That is, until Congress passed the Child Pornography Protection
Act of 1996 (CPPA).104 This new federal definition of child pornography stepped beyond
the scope of Ferber¶V KDUP-in-production boundaries by including both virtual and
morphed pornography in its definition. 105 Congress crafted the CPPA to include virtual
child pornography in its definition, reacting to the computer technology that makes virtual
child pornography possible.106 Section 2256(8)(B) of the CPPA defined child
SRUQRJUDSK\DV³DQ\YLVXDOGHSLFWLRQLQFOXGLQJDQ\SKRWRJUDSK\ILOPYLGHRSLFWXUHRU
computer or computer-JHQHUDWHGLPDJHRUSLFWXUH´WKDW³LVor is indistinguishable from,
that of a miQRUHQJDJLQJLQVH[XDOO\H[SOLFLWFRQGXFW´107 7KH&33$¶VODQJXDJHSURYLGHG
the opportunity for the United States Supreme Court to consider the definition of child
pornography in light of the First Amendment, obscenity, and Ferber. Ultimately, the
provisions proscribing virtual child pornography were held unconstitutional by Ashcroft v.
Free Speech Coalition.108
The Ashcroft Court held that virtual pornography was not child pornography as
defined by Ferber because no actual children were involved in the production of these

42010-tul_55-2 Sheet No. 87 Side B

03/03/2020 13:59:43

BEACHAM, C - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

322

2/18/2020 6:57 AM

TULSA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:311

images.109 Ashcroft stated that the statute banned a substantial amount of materials that
ZHUHQHLWKHUREVFHQHQRU³µLQWULQVLFDOO\UHODWHG¶WRWKHVH[XDODEXVHRIFKLOGUHQ´ 110 This
connection between child pornography and the sexual abuse of children was the bedrock
of the Ferber &RXUW¶VFRQVWLWXWLRQDOUHDVRQLQJ111 Therefore, virtual child pornography fell
short of the harm-in-production logic of Ferber and this specific provision of the CPPA
was held to be unconstitutionally broad.112
Even though the Supreme Court disagreed, the government strongly contended that
virtual child pornography was worthy of inclusion in federal law. 113 First, it could be used
E\ SHGRSKLOHV WR ³VHGXFH FKLOGUHQ´114 6HFRQG ³YLUWXDO FKLOG SRUQRJUDSK\ ZKHWV WKH
appetite of pedRSKLOHV´115 Third, the objective of eliminating the market for child
SRUQRJUDSK\ ³QHFHVVLWDWHV D SURKLELWLRQ RQ YLUWXDO LPDJHV DV ZHOO´ 116 Lastly, the
JRYHUQPHQWDUJXHGWKDWDOORZLQJ YLUWXDOFKLOGSRUQRJUDSK\³PDNHVLWYHU\GLIILFXOW´WR
prosecute cases involving non-virtual child pornography.117 However, Ashcroft concluded
WKDWZKLOH³>W@KHVH[XDODEXVHRIDFKLOGLVDPRVWVHULRXVFULPHDQGDQDFWUHSXJQDQWWR
the moral instincts of a decent people[,] . . . [t]he prospect of crime . . . by itself does not
jusWLI\ODZVVXSSUHVVLQJSURWHFWHGVSHHFK´118 In other words, Ashcroft held that the link
EHWZHHQYLUWXDOFKLOGSRUQRJUDSK\DQGWKHKDUPRIFKLOGVH[XDODEXVHZDVWRR³FRQWLQJHQW
DQGLQGLUHFW´119
Ashcroft did, in dicta, mention morphed child pornography. The Ashcroft Court only
ruled on section 2256(8)(D) of the CPPA, which defined virtual child pornography. 120
However, the Court did not touch section 2256(8)(C), which prohibits morphed child
SRUQRJUDSK\ E\ SURKLELWLQJ DQ\ ³YLVXDO GHSLFWLRQ >WKDW@ KDV EHHQ FUHDWHG DGDSWHG RU
modified to appear WKDWDQLGHQWLILDEOHPLQRULVHQJDJLQJLQVH[XDOO\H[SOLFLWFRQGXFW´121
The Court discussed this distinction in dicta, stating that images of real children edited so
WKDWWKHFKLOGUHQDSSHDUWREHHQJDJHGLQVH[XDODFWV³LPSOLFDWHWKHLQWHUHVWVRIUHDOFKLOGUHQ
and are in that sense closer to the images in Ferber´122 In recent years, circuit courts have
mined the meaning of those words.123

03/03/2020 13:59:43
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109. Id. at 250.
110. Id.
111. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982).
112. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 250, 256.
113. Id. at 250.
114. Id. at 251.
115. Id. at 253.
116. Id. at 254.
117. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 254.
118. Id. at 244±45.
119. Id. at 250.
120. Id. at 242.
121. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C) (emphasis added).
122. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 242.
123. See, e.g., Shoemaker v. Taylor, 730 F.3d 778, 787 (9th Cir. 2013); Doe v. Boland, 698 F.3d 877, 883 (6th
Cir. 2012); United States v. Hotaling, 634 F.3d 725, 729 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v. Bach, 400 F.3d 622,
632 (8th Cir. 2005).
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D. The Federal Circuit Courts and the Harms Caused by Morphed Child Pornography
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124. Bach, 400 F.3d at 630.
125. Id. at 625.
126. Id. at 632.
127. Id. at 630.
128. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C) (³[S]uch visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to appear that
an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct.´).
129. Bach, 400 F.3d at 632.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. United States v. Hotaling, 634 F.3d 725, 729±30 (2d Cir. 2011).
135. Id. at 727.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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In United States v. Bach, the Eighth Circuit considered the constitutionality of
section 2256(8)(C) of the CPPA.124 In Bach, the defendant was charged with possession
of child pornography.125 7KHFKLOGSRUQRJUDSK\LQTXHVWLRQZDVDQLPDJHZKHUHWKH³KHDG
of a well known juvenile . . . was skillfully inserted onto the body of the nude boy so that
the resulting depiction appear[ed] to be a picture of [the well known juvenile] engaging in
VH[XDOO\H[SOLFLWFRQGXFW ZLWKD NQRZLQJ JULQ´ 126 The defendant, relying on Ashcroft,
argued that the image did not involve the abuse of a real minor and therefore morphed
images should not be included in the statute. 127 Disagreeing, the court applied the words
of section 2256(8)(C)128 DQGGHWHUPLQHGWKDWWKLVLPDJH³LPSOLFDWHVWKHLQWHUHVWVRIDUHDO
FKLOG´129
The image depicted the child in a sexual manner because his face was pasted onto
³D\RXQJQXGHER\ZKRLVJULQQLQJDQGsitting in a tree in a lascivious pose with a full
HUHFWLRQ KLV OHJV VSUHDG DQG KLV SHOYLV WLOWHG XSZDUG´130 However, even though this
image was slightly different than the previously-mentioned examples of morphed child
pornography (because the body used in the photo editing was not an adult body) the court
determined that the interests implicated were of the child whose face was placed on the
body.131 Even though the well-known child was not actually involved in the production
of the image, he was an identifiable²actual²FKLOGKDUPHGDQG³YLFWLPL]HGHYHU\WLPH
WKHSLFWXUHLVGLVSOD\HG´132 7KHUHIRUHWKHFKLOGZDVD³YLFWLPRIVH[XDOH[SORLWDWLRQ´DQG
section 2256(8)(C) of the CPPPA incorporating morphed child pornography was affirmed
as constitutional because LW SURWHFWHG WKH FKLOG¶V ³SK\VLFDO DQG SV\FKRORJLFDO ZHOO
EHLQJ´133
7KH 6HFRQG &LUFXLW DGRSWHG WKH (LJKWK &LUFXLW¶V UHDVRQLQJ LQ United States v.
Hotaling.134 Here, the defendant created morphed child pornography by superimposing
photos of the faces of six different young girls onto the bodies of nude adult females
engaged in sexually explicit conduct. 135 One of the photos overlaid the face of a young
girl onto a partially nude adult female who was handcuffed, shackled, wearing a collar and
leash, and tied to a dresser.136 6RPH RI WKH YLFWLPV ZHUH IULHQGV ZLWK WKH GHIHQGDQW¶V
daughter.137 The defendant contended that no child was harmed in the production of the
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photos, which were created only to record his mental fantasies.138 However, the Hotaling
court held that morphed child pornography was rightly included in federal law because the
³VL[ LGHQWLILDEOH PLQRU IHPDOHV  . . were at risk of reputational harm and suffered the
psychological harm of knowing that their images were exploited and prepared for
distribution by DWUXVWHGDGXOW´139 Stretching the Ferber definition of harm, the Hotaling
FRXUWQRWHGWKDW³PLQRUVDUHKDUPHGQRWRQO\GXULQJWKHFUHDWLRQRIFKLOGSRUQRJUDSK\EXW
DUHDOVRKDXQWHGIRU\HDUVE\WKHNQRZOHGJHRILWVFRQWLQXHGFLUFXODWLRQ´ 140 Therefore,
the primary inquiry regarding the definition of child pornography is whether or not the
LPDJH ³LPSOLFDWHV WKH LQWHUHVWV RI DQ DFWXDO PLQRU´141 The Hotaling court held that
morphed child pornography does implicate such interests.142
Hotaling reasoned that while thH QXGH ERGLHV ZHUH DGXOW WKH ³RQO\ UHFRJQL]DEOH
SHUVRQV>LQWKH SKRWRV@ ZHUH WKH PLQRUV´ 143 Furthermore, the real names of the young
JLUOVZHUHLQFOXGHGRQPDQ\RIWKHLPDJHV³EROVWHULQJWKHFRQQHFWLRQVEHWZHHQWKHDFWXDO
minor and the sexually explicit coQGXFW´144 The Hotaling court explicitly distinguished
these morphed images from virtual child pornography because of the connection to actual
children.145 However, while relying on the precedent of Ferber, the harms discussed in
Hotaling were tweaked slightly from the harm-in-production logic. Hotaling stated that
the harms associated with morphed images²reputational, emotional, and psychological²
are trigged the moment a child pornographer cuts and pastes the image of a child into a
pornographic image.146 As a result, both the Eighth and Second Circuits categorized
morphed child pornography within the terms found in section 2256(8)(C) of the CPPA and
outside the protections of the First Amendment. The Ninth Circuit would soon join.
In Shoemaker v. Taylor, the Ninth Circuit noted that the Ashcroft Court left the issue
of morphed child pornography and the First Amendment unresolved.147 Shoemaker stated
WKDWSURVFULELQJWKHVHW\SHVRILPDJHVLVQHFHVVDU\EHFDXVHWKH\³GLUHFWO\LPSOLFDWHWKH
intereVWRISURWHFWLQJFKLOGUHQIURPKDUP´ZKLFKLVDFRPSHOOLQJLQWHUHVW 148 Shoemaker
explained as follows:
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138. Id.
139. Hotaling, 634 F.3d at 730.
140. Id. at 728.
141. Id. at 729.
142. Id. at 729±30 (stating, ³[w]e agree with the Eighth Circuit that the interests of actual minors are implicated
when their faces are used in creating morphed images that make it appear that they are performing sexually
explicit acts´).
143. Id. at 730.
144. Hotaling, 634 F.3d at 730.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Shoemaker v. Taylor, 730 F.3d 778, 787 (9th Cir. 2013).
148. Id. at 786.
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Morphed images of children engaged in sexual activity directly implicate the interest of
protecting children from harm, an interest the Supreme Court deemed compelling in Ferber.
7KHUH WKH &RXUW H[SODLQHG WKDW VWDWHV KDYH D FRPSHOOLQJ LQWHUHVW LQ ³VDIHJXDUGLQJ WKH
physical and psychological well-EHLQJRIDPLQRU´DQGWKH³SUHYHQWLRQRIVH[XDOH[SORLWDWLRQ
DQG DEXVH RI FKLOGUHQ´  . . The Court further noted that actual child pornography is
³LQWULQVLFDOO\UHODWHGWRWKHVH[XDODEXVHRIFKLOGUHQ´EHFDXVHLWLV³DSHUPDQHQWUHFRUGRIWKH
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FKLOGUHQ¶VSDUWLFLSDWLRQDQGWKHKDUPWRWKHFKLOGLVH[DFHUEDWHGE\>LWV@FLUFXODWLRQ´149

The Shoemaker court noted that the Ferber reasoning explains why the Second and Eighth
Circuits also consider morphed child pornography not only within the statutory definition
of section 2256(8)(C) of the CPPA but also outside First Amendment protections. 150
7KH6L[WK&LUFXLW¶VGHFLVLRQLn Doe v. Boland is particularly insightful. The morphed
child pornography discussed in this case is almost identical to the two different examples
of morphed child pornography previously discussed.151 In one, the defendant edited an
innocent photo of a child eating a donut, replacing the donut with a picture of a penis.152
In another photo, the defendant placed the face of another child onto a photo of a nude
woman engaging in sex acts with two other men. 153 Initially the Boland court referenced
WKH³VWUDLJKWIRUZDUG´UDWLRQDOHEHKLQGWKHSURVFULSWLRQRIFKLOGSRUQRJUDSK\²to protect
FKLOGUHQIURPDEXVHWKDWLV³µLQWULQVLFDOO\UHODWHG¶WRWKHXQGHUO\LQJDEXVH´ 154 Because
WKH&33$WDUJHWVPRUSKHGLPDJHVDVDQLQYDVLRQRIWKH³FKLOG¶VSULYDF\DQGUHSXWDWLRQDO
interests´155 Boland concluded that the children in morphed child pornography are rightly
FRQVLGHUHG³UHDOYLFWLPV´156 The defendant argued that the psychological harm implicated
by morphed child pornography only materializes if or when the child victim becomes
aware of the photo and experiences that harm upon viewing the image. 157 However, the
Boland FRXUWUHMHFWHGWKLVDUJXPHQWVWDWLQJWKDW³>W@KHFUHDWLRQDQGLQLWLDOSXEOLFDWLRQRI
WKHLPDJHVLWVHOIKDUPHGWKH>FKLOGUHQ@´158
IV. OKLAHOMA LAW DANGEROUSLY IGNORES MORPHED CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY
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149. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756±57, 759 (1982)).
150. Id. at 786±87.
151. Doe v. Boland, 698 F.3d 877, 879 (6th Cir. 2012).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 883 (quoting Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759).
155. Id. at 884 (quoting Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121(1)(7), 110
Stat. 3009 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2256).
156. Boland, 698 F.3d at 883.
157. Id. at 884.
158. Id.
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In view of the federal holdings, it is clear that morphed child pornography falls
outside First Amendment protection and is prohibited by federal law. Federal courts have
consistently supplied ample justification to view such images as harmful, triggering the
need to protect the interest of children. However, differences between federal law and state
law require a separate analysis to determine if morphed child pornography is similarly
addressed at the state level. In other words, while the federal government has exposed
morphed child pornography, it is the responsibility of the states to incorporate morphed
images in their chosen definitions of child pornography. This section utilizes the different
tools of statutory interpretation to show that morphed child pornography is likely not
prohibited by Oklahoma law.
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A. Oklahoma’s Definition of Child Pornography
While the federal language defining child pornography specifically addresses
morphed child pornography, it appears that the Oklahoma statute defining child
SRUQRJUDSK\GRHVQRW2NODKRPD¶VGHILQLWLRQLVDVIROORZV
³>&@KLOGSRUQRJUDSK\´PHDQVDQGLQFOXGHVDQ\YLVXDOGHSLFWLRQRULQGLYLGXDOLPDJHVWRUHG
or contained in any format on any medium including, but not limited to, film, motion picture,
videotape, photograph, negative, undeveloped film, slide, photographic product,
reproduction of a photographic product, play or performance wherein a minor under the age
of eighteen (18) years is engaged in any act with a person, other than his or her spouse, of
sexual intercourse which is normal or perverted, in any act of anal sodomy, in any act of
sexual activity with an animal, in any act of sadomasochistic abuse including, but not limited
to, flagellation or torture, or the condition of being fettered, bound or otherwise physically
restrained in the context of sexual conduct, in any act of fellatio or cunnilingus, in any act of
excretion in the context of sexual conduct, in any lewd exhibition of the uncovered genitals
in the context of masturbation or other sexual conduct, or where the lewd exhibition of the
uncovered genitals, buttocks or, if such minor is a female, the breast, has the purpose of
sexual stimulation of the viewer, or wherein a person under the age of eighteen (18) years
observes such acts or exhibitions.159

1. The Plain Meaning
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals stated thaWVWDWXWHVPXVW³EHFRQVWUXHG
DFFRUGLQJWRWKHSODLQDQGRUGLQDU\PHDQLQJRIWKHLUODQJXDJH´ 162 7KHZRUGV³DQ\YLVXDO
depiction or individual image . . . wherein a minor . . . is engaged in any act . . . of sexual
LQWHUFRXUVH´ DUH VLJQLILFDQW163 Do these words refer to actual engagement in sexual
activity at the time the image is captured? Or, is the appearance of engaging in sexual
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The pertinent question is whether this language includes morphed images. It should be
noted that this statute does not include the language found in federal definition defining
FKLOGSRUQRJUDSK\DVDQ\YLVXDOGHSLFWLRQWKDW³KDs been created, adapted, or modified to
appear WKDW DQ LGHQWLILDEOH PLQRU LV HQJDJLQJ LQ VH[XDOO\ H[SOLFLW FRQGXFW´160 These
differences between the federal and Oklahoma statutes eliminate the possibility of leaning
on the federal meaning to interpret OklahRPD¶V FKRVHQ ODQJXDJH $GGLWLRQDOO\ WKH
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals offers sparse help in interpretation because it has
not yet decided a case involving these specific images. However, the court outlined a
number of principles to facilitate the work of statutory interpretation, including:
interpreting the plain and ordinary meaning of the language, looking toward the legislative
intent, reconciling provisions for a consistent interpretation, and staying within the
boundaries established by the legislature.161 Therefore, a thorough explanation of the
language, legislative intent, and other state interpretations will be helpful in construing
2NODKRPD¶VGHILQLWLRQRIFKLOGSRUQRJUDSK\

OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1024.1(A) (emphasis added).
18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C) (emphasis added).
State v. Young, 989 P.2d 949, 955 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999).
Id.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1024.1(A).

C M
Y K

42010-tul_55-2 Sheet No. 90 Side A

03/03/2020 13:59:43

BEACHAM, C - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

2/18/2020 6:57 AM

METAMORPHOSIS

327

2. The Legislative Intent and Boundaries
The legislative purpose undergirding chapter 39 of 2NODKRPD¶V FULPLQDO FRGH
where child pornography iVGHILQHGLVWR³SUHYHQWWKHVH[XDOH[SORLWDWLRQRIPLQRUV´ 170
Unfortunately, this rationale is too broad to be helpful when interpreting the definition of
child pornography in light of morphed images. Without a specific legislative statement, it
is challenging to interpret the words of the statute differently than rendered by the plain
PHDQLQJ$ORRNLQWRWKHFKDQJHVRI2NODKRPD¶VREVFHQLW\DQGFKLOGSRUQRJUDSK\ODZV
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164. Engaged, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/engaged (last
visited Jan. 21, 2019).
165. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C).
166. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1024.1(A).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Arganbright v. State, 328 P.3d 1212, 1217 (Okla. Crim. App. 2014).
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activity via manipulation also included? A plain interpretation leads to the former
conclusion, excluding morphed child SRUQRJUDSK\IURP2NODKRPD¶VGHILQLWLRQ
7KHZRUG³HQJDJHG´LVGHILQHGE\:HEVWHU¶VGLFWLRQDU\DV³LQYROYHGLQDFWLYLW\´ 164
However, morphed images only make it appear as though the child is engaged in sexual
activity. As a result, it is correct to say that the children in morphed child pornography are
not involved in the activity of sexual intercourse. Therefore, the plain meaning of
³HQJDJHG´GHVFULEHVDFWXDOLQYROYHPHQWXQOHVVRWKHUZRUGVVXSSO\DGGLWLRQDOPHDQLQJ
The federal statute does this by insertiQJWKHSKUDVH³PRGLILHGWRDSSHDU´LQWKHIHGHUDO
definition.165 :LWKRXWWKLVTXDOLILFDWLRQWKHSODLQPHDQLQJRI2NODKRPD¶VVWDWXWHZRXOG
exclude morphed child pornography.
+RZHYHUWKHZRUGV³DQ\YLVXDOGHSLFWLRQ´QHDUWKHEHJLQQLQJRIWKHVWDWXWHFRXOG
be understood to include morphed images. 166 Plainly speaking, morphed child
pornography is a visual depiction of sexual activity. However, the syntax of the statute
UHYHDOVWKDWWKHZRUG³GHSLFWLRQ´GHVFULEHVWKHW\SHRIimage, not the content of the image.
DiUHFWO\ IROORZLQJ WKH ZRUGV ³DQ\ YLVXDO GHSLFWLRQ,´ WKH VWDWXWH OLVWV VHYHUDO TXDOLILHG
GHSLFWLRQV ³ILOP PRWLRQ SLFWXUH YLGHRWDSH SKRWRJUDSK QHJDWLYH XQGHYHORSHG ILOP
slide, photographic product, reproduction of a photographic product, play or
perforPDQFH´167 7KHUHIRUH RQO\ WKH ZRUG ³HQJDJHG´ LV SURYLGHG WR VXSSO\ WKH
relationship between the child and the image.168 ,QRWKHUZRUGV³GHSLFWLRQ´LVQRWXVHGDV
DQDGMHFWLYHWRPRGLI\³VH[XDOLQWHUFRXUVH´EXWUDWKHULWLVXVHGDVDQRXQLQWKHOLVWRI
visual images that contain child pornography.
Leaning upon the plain words of the statute, Oklahoma law requires an actual
child²not merely an apparent child²to be engaged in sexual activity at the time the
image is taken to qualify as child pornography. As is common, Oklahoma also includes
WKH ³OHZG H[KLELWLRQ RI WKH XQFRYHUHG JHQLWDOV´ ODWHU LQ LWV GHILQLWLRQ 169 These two
possible qualifications²engagement in sexual activity or lewd nudity²certainly do not
include morphed child pornography. As a result, the plDLQUHDGLQJRI2NODKRPD¶VVWDWXWH
would not include images of actual and clothed children morphed to make it appear as
though they are engaging in sexual activity.
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provides some insight into the words of the current definition.
In 2000, the Oklahoma legislature added child pornography to the criminal code,
separate and distinct from the obscenity provisions. 171 The current language mirrors the
2000 definition, although some minor alterations have been made.172 Interestingly, at the
WLPHZKHQWKLVFKDQJHZDVXQGHUWDNHQ2NODKRPD¶VROGREVFHQLW\VWDWXWHGHILQHGREVFHQH
PDWHULDOVDVWKRVH³ZKHUHLQWKHPLQRULVHQJDJHGLQRUportrayed, depicted, or represented
DV HQJDJLQJ LQ DQ\ DFW RI VH[XDO LQWHUFRXUVH´ 173 Remarkably, this older obscenity
language appears to include PRUSKHGFKLOGSRUQRJUDSK\LQ2NODKRPD¶VREVFHQLW\VWDWXWH
of the past. However, when adding child pornography to the criminal code in 2000, the
Oklahoma legislature did not borrow this language. Furthermore, the Oklahoma legislature
has removed this language from the current definition of obscene materials, only including
³GHSLFWLRQV RU GHVFULSWLRQV RI VH[XDO FRQGXFW ZKLFK DUH SDWHQWO\ RIIHQVLYH´ 174 While
morphed child pornography might fall within this current obscenity definition, the
legislative history is not likely to support an inclusion of these images in the child
pornography definition. The current definition, when crafted in 2000, did not use the most
descriptive and clear language, which is only found in the old obscenity definition. As a
result, the legislative history indicates either an intentional move away from incorporating
morphed child pornography, or a choice that had the unintended and unrealized
consequence of distancing morphed child pornography from Oklahoma law.
Furthermore, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals stated that it is not
DSSURSULDWHWR³LQWHUSUHWDVWDWXWHWRDGGUHVVDPDWWHUWKH/HJLVODWXUHFKRVHQRWWRDGGUHVV
even if . . . the interpretation might produce a reasonable result. [The court] will not enlarge
WKHPHDQLQJRIZRUGVLQFOXGHGLQDVWDWXWHWRFUHDWHDFULPHQRWGHILQHGE\WKDWVWDWXWH´175
&RQVLGHULQJERWKWKHSODLQPHDQLQJRIWKHZRUG³HQJDJHG´DQGWKHOHJLVODWLYHKLVWRU\RI
the statute, it is evident tKDWLQWHUSUHWLQJ2NODKRPD¶VGHILQLWLRQRIFKLOGSRUQRJUDSK\WR
include morphed images would violate the principles of statutory interpretation, putting
ZRUGVLQWRWKHPRXWKRI2NODKRPD¶V/HJLVODWXUH

Unlike Oklahoma, other state courts have interpreted their child pornography
statutes in light of morphed child pornography.176 In the three state cases discussed below,
the courts found that morphed child pornography was not LQFOXGHGLQWKHUHVSHFWLYHVWDWH¶V
statutory definition of child pornography.
1. California: People v. Gerber
In 2008 a California father, Gerber, exposed his thirteen-year-old daughter, J., to
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171. 2000 Okla. Sess. Laws 795 (codified as amended at OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1024.1).
172. Compare OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1024.1 (2000) (amended 2012), with OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1024.1(A).
173. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1021.3 (2000) (emphasis added) (amended 2012).
174. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1024.1(B)(1)(a).
175. State v. Young, 989 P.2d 949, 955 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999).
176. See, e.g., People v. Gerber, 196 Cal. App. 4th 368, 386 (2011); Parker v. State, 81 So. 3d 451, 453±54
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); State v. Zidel, 940 A.2d 255, 256±57 (N.H. 2008).
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alcohol and drugs.177 After introducing her to cocaine, he offered her more cocaine if she
would pose for a few photos.178 J. agreed.179 She was uncomfortable, because he
instructed her to lean over, which revealed her cleavage.180 He reassured her that this was
SKRWRJUDSKLF³DUW´181
$IWHUWKHIDWKHUDQGGDXJKWHUVQRUWHGFRFDLQHKHVWDWHGWKDW³VKHRZHGKLPSLFWXUHV
LQ >KHU@ XQGHUZHDU´182 5HDOL]LQJ VKH ZDV ³FDXJKW LQ WKH PLGGOH RI D VLWXDWLRQ´ VKH
complied.183 He took various photos of J. in her bra and underwear.184 She was crying.185
Later that night she told her mother about the alcohol, drugs, and photos. 186 The father
was arrested.187
3ROLFHUHFRYHUHGVHYHQSRUQRJUDSKLFSKRWRVIURPWKHIDWKHU¶VFRPSXWHU 188 Gerber
admitted to using Microsoft Paint to alter pornographic pictures of women he had collected
E\ UHSODFLQJ WKH ZRPHQ¶V IDFHV ZLWK KLV GDXJKWHU¶V IDFH 189 This morphed child
pornography, and not the photos of his daughter in her bra and underwear, were the focus
of the case and criminal charge.190 In People v. Gerber, the California Court of Appeals
reversed the conviction for possession of child pornography. 191
The Gerber court addressed whether the morphed child pornography violated
California law.192 The relevant California statute defined child pornography as an image
WKDW³GHSLFWVDSHUVRQXQGHUWKHDJHRI\HDUVSHUVRQDOO\HQJDJLQJLQRUVLPXODWLQJVH[XDO
FRQGXFW´193 TKH FRXUW KHOG WKDW WKH &DOLIRUQLD VWDWXWH ³UHTXLUHV D UHDO FKLOG WR KDYH
DFWXDOO\ HQJDJHG LQ RU VLPXODWHG WKH VH[XDO FRQGXFW GHSLFWHG´ WKHUHE\ UHYHUVLQJ WKH
conviction for possession of child pornography. 194 The Gerber court disagreed with the
SURVHFXWLRQ¶V DUJXPHQWWKDWWKHZRUG³GHSLFW´LQWKHGHILQLWLRQLQFRUSRUDWHVWKHPRUSKHG
photos because the photos do depict J. as the child engaged in sexual conduct. 195 Instead,
Gerber IRFXVHGRQSODLQLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHZRUG³SHUVRQDOO\´WKHOHJLVODWLYHKLVWRU\
and the constitutional implications to hold differently. 196 Because of the plain definition
RI ³SHUVRQDOO\´ DQG WKH OHJLVODWLYH KLVWRU\ WKH FRXUW GHWHUPLQHG WKDW PRUSKHG FKLOG
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Gerber, 196 Cal. App. 4th at 373, 374.
Id. at 375.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Gerber, 196 Cal. App. 4th at 375.
Id.
Id. at 376.
Id.
Id.
Gerber, 196 Cal. App. 4th at 376.
Id.
Id. at 377.
Id. at 378.
Id. at 386.
Gerber, 196 Cal. App. 4th at 382.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.11(a).
Gerber, 196 Cal. App. 4th at 371±72.
Id. at 378.
Id.
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pornography was not banned by California law. 197
Gerber leaned not only on the plain meaning of the California statute, but also on
constitutional principles.198 ,QWHUHVWLQJO\WKHFRXUWH[WLQJXLVKHG³DQ\OLQJHULQJGRXEWV´
about this interpretation by relying on Ashcroft.199 Gerber²unlike the federal circuit
courts²distinguished the harm described in Ferber from the harm caused by morphed
child pornography.200 Gerber noted that Ferber ³ZDVEDVHGXSRQKRZ>FKLOGSRUQRJUDSK\@
ZDVPDGHQRWRQZKDWLWFRPPXQLFDWHG´DQGWKDW³VSHHFK>ZKLFK@LVQHLWKHUREVFHQHQRU
the product of sexual abuse . . . does not fall outside the protection of the First
$PHQGPHQW´201 Therefore, the California Court of Appeals stated:
[T]hat the articulated rationales underlying both the Ferber and [Ashcroft] decisions compel
the conclusion that such altered materials are closer to virtual child pornography than to real
FKLOGSRUQRJUDSK\VLQFHWKHXVHRISKRWRHGLWLQJVRIWZDUHWRUHSODFHDQDGXOW¶VKHDGZLWKD
FKLOG¶V KHDG RQ SRUQRJUDSKLF LPDJHV RI WKH DGXOW GRHV QRW QHFHVVDULO\ LQYROYH VH[XDO
exploitation of an actual child.202

Gerber generated calls for the amendment of California child pornography law. 203
However, the current statute is unchanged since the Gerber decision.204
2. Florida: Parker v. State

Id. at 371.
Id. at 383.
Gerber, 196 Cal App. 4th at 383.
Id. at 386.
Id. at 385 (quoting Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 250±51 (2002)).
Id. at 386.
See generally Yamada, supra note 104, at 229, 231.
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.11(a).
Parker v. State, 81 So. 3d 451, 452 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Parker, 81 So. 3d at 453 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 827.071(5)(a)) .
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,Q WKH VDPH \HDU DV *HUEHU¶V GHFLVLRQ WKH 'LVWULFW &RXUW RI $SSHDOV RI )ORULGD
published a similar opinion. The defendant, Parker, a Sunday school teacher, photographed
many children.205 :KLOH WKH SKRWRV ZHUH QRUPDO SKRWRV ³WKH LQQRFHQFH WXUQHG
SHUYHUVH´206 Parker cut the heads off of the children in the photos and pasted them onto
the bodies of nude, or partially nude, women engaged in sexual activity. 207 He was charged
and convicted of possession of child pornography. 208 However, in Parker v. State, the
'LVWULFW&RXUWRI$SSHDOUHYHUVHGUHDVRQLQJWKDW3DUNHU¶V SRVVHVVLRQRI PRUSKHGFKLOd
SRUQRJUDSK\³HVFDSHVWKHJUDVSRIWKHVWDWXWHRQZKLFKWKH6WDWHSURFHHGV´209
Parker narrowed its focus to the applicable Florida statute that defined child
SRUQRJUDSK\DV³DSKRWRJUDSK . . representation . . . or other presentation which, in whole
or iQ SDUW KH RU VKH NQRZV WR LQFOXGH DQ\ VH[XDO FRQGXFW E\ D FKLOG´ 210 While this
GHILQLWLRQ GRHV QRW FRQWDLQ WKH ZRUG ³SHUVRQDOO\´ OLNH WKH &DOLIRUQLD VWDWXWH Parker
FRQFOXGHGWKDWWKHPRUSKHGLPDJHV³OHDYHQRGRXEWWKDWQRFKLOGHQJDJHGLQWKHVH[XDO
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FRQGXFW´211 Restrained by the words of the Florida legislature, the Parker court held that
WKH)ORULGDVWDWXWH³UHTXLUHVWKDWWKHGHSLFWHGVH[XDOFRQGXFWEHWKDWRIDFKLOG´ 212
Bolstering its decision, the Parker court also focused on the legislative intent behind
the statute, which was concerned with the sexual exploitation of children. 213 The court
quoted language from 1983 in which the legislature expressed its concern in stopping the
³XVHRIFKLOGUHQLQVH[XDOSHUIRUPDQFHV´214 Parker pointed out that the title of the statute
LV³$EXVHRI&KLOGUHQ´215
5HIHUHQFLQJWKH)LUVW$PHQGPHQW¶VOHJDOUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKFKLOGSRUQRJUDSK\WKH
Parker court plainly stated that the federal statutes, and their interpretation by the circuit
FRXUWV ZDV RI ³OLWWOH DLG´ LQ LWV GHcision.216 However, Parker noted that if the Florida
³OHJLVODWXUHZDQWVWRIROORZ&RQJUHVV¶VH[DPSOHDQGSURKLELWWKHSRVVHVVLRQRIWKHW\SHV
of photographs involved here, [the court is] confident that it can, and perhaps should, craft
an appropriate statute´217 Therefore, Parker indicates that other state courts will handcuff
their decision to the state statute, unable to rely on federal statute or precedent to reach the
GHFLVLRQ WKDW LW ³SHUKDSV VKRXOG´218 Like California, the legislature of Florida has not
adopted a broader definition of child pornography since this decision. 219
3. New Hampshire: State v. Zidel

Id. at 453.
Id.
Id. at 454.
Id.
Parker, 81 So. 3d at 455.
Id. at 455.
Id. at 457 (emphasis added).
Id.
FLA. STAT. § 827.071(5)(a).
State v. Zidel, 940 A.2d 255, 265 (N.H. 2008).
Id. at 257.
Id. at 265.
Id. at 263.
Id. at 264.
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In State v. Zidel the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed a conviction for the
possession of morphed child pornography. 220 However, unlike the previous cases from
California and Florida, the Zidel court focused primarily on the constitutional issues
already addressed at the federal level. 221 Disagreeing with the Eighth Circuit in Bach,
Zidel held that criminalizing the possession of morphed child pornography was an
unconstitutional overstep by New Hampshire state law. 222 In its emphasis on federal
precedent, rather than on state statutory interpretation, Zidel VWDWHGWKDW³QRGHPRQVWUDEOH
harms results to the child [who] . .  LV GHSLFWHG´ LQ PRUSKHG FKLOG Sornography.223
Therefore, because the court held morphed child pornography was not intrinsically related
to the sexual abuse of children, the conviction could not stand. 224
Therefore, whether states have focused on the interpretation of state statutes (like
California and Florida) or leaned on constitutional arguments (like New Hampshire), the
trend is for state courts to find that morphed child pornography is not included in the state
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definitions of child pornography. 225 This tendency, coupled with the plain meaning of
2NODKRPD¶VVWDWXWHDQGWKHOHJLVODWLYHKLVWRU\VWURQJO\IDYRUVWKHSRVLWLRQWKDWPRUSKHG
images are not considered child pornography under Oklahoma law.
V. THE NEED TO INCLUDE MORPHED CHILD PORNOGRAPHY IN OKLAHOMA
LAW
It is incumbent on any decent society to value and protect children because of their
intrinsic worth. This value, which flows from the inherent dignity of humanity, calls for a
public policy that protects children from those who might cause them harm. Morphed child
pornography causes harm, exploits children as sexual objects, and violates basic notions
RIKXPDQGLJQLW\7KHUHIRUHPRUSKHGFKLOGSRUQRJUDSK\VKRXOGEHDGGHGWR2NODKRPD¶V
legal definition of child pornography.
A. Morphed Child Pornography Harms and Exploits Children

C M
Y K

03/03/2020 13:59:43

225. See, e.g., People v. Gerber, 196 Cal. App. 4th 368, 371±72 (2011); Parker v. State, 81 So. 3d 451, 453±
54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Zidel, 940 A.2d at 265.
226. OST, supra note 47, at 104.
227. Id.
228. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758 n.9 (1982).
229. O¶DONNELL & MILNER, supra note 6, at 69.
230. Mary Graw Leary, The Language of Child Sexual Abuse and Exploitation, in REFINING CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY LAW: CRIME, LANGUAGE, AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 109, 133 (Carissa Byrne Hessick ed.,
2016); see also National Center for Missing & Exploited Children, Sexual Abuse Imagery: Overview,
http://www.missingkids.com/theissues/sexualabuseimagery (last visited Mar. 16, 2019).
231. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757 (stating that ³[t]he prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children
constitutes a government objective of surpassing importance´).
232. Id. at 759.
233. Id. at 760.
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The harm connected to traditional images of child pornography is self-evident.226
This relationship between traditional child pornography and child sexual abuse is so
XQDGXOWHUDWHGWKDWLW³RYHUZKHOPLQJO\MXVWLILHVWKHFULPLQDOL]DWLRQ´RIFKLOGSRUQRJUDSK\
production and possession.227 Therefore, child pornography is detrimental to children and
societies, because it attacks the very core of flourishing healthy communities²
children.228 This link makes clear that traditional images of child pornography are
repulsive, anGDOVR³DUHFRUGRIDFULPHVFHQH´229 In fact, the connection between child
pornography and child sexual abuse is so well-defined that multiple organizations and
DXWKRUV UHMHFW WKH WHUP ³FKLOG SRUQRJUDSK\´ DQG GHVFULEH WKHVH W\SHV RI LPDJHV DV
³VH[XDOO\DEXVLYHLPDJHVRIFKLOGUHQ´RU³FKLOGVH[XDODEXVHLPDJHV´ 230
The harm of child sexual abuse is the bedrock of Ferber’s reasoning to remove child
pornography from First Amendment protections. 231 But this direct harm-in-production
was not the only harm discussed by Ferber. The Ferber Court also described the derivative
KDUPVRIFKLOGSRUQRJUDSK\VWDWLQJWKDWWKHKDUPRIVH[XDODEXVHLV³H[DFHUEDWHGE\>FKLOG
SRUQRJUDSK\¶V@FLUFXODWLRQ´232 Ferber connected the harm-in-production to the harm-incirculation through an economic argument, holding that the market which fuels child
sexual abuse would dry if the circulation of images were banned. 233 It is this connection
between the sexual abuse and the harm-in-circulation that poses a problem for the
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234. Id. at 759.
235. Weinstein, supra note 80, at 45.
236. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990).
237. Carissa Byrne Hessick, Setting Definitional Limits for the Child Pornography Exception, in REFINING
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAW: CRIME, LANGUAGE, AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 57, 61 (Carissa Byrne Hessick
ed., 2016).
238. Id.
239. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 256 (2002).
240. Id. at 245; Hessick, supra note 237, at 61 (writing that ³[t]he Ashcroft Court also left no doubt that the
harm in creation is the touchstone of its child pornography doctrine´).
241. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 242.
242. GILLESPIE, supra note 22, at 20.
243. See, e.g., Shoemaker v. Taylor, 730 F.3d 778, 786 (9th Cir. 2013); Doe v. Boland, 698 F.3d 877, 884 (6th
Cir. 2012); United States v. Hotaling, 634 F.3d 725, 730 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v. Bach, 400 F.3d 622,
632 (8th Cir. 2005).
244. Bach, 400 F.3d at 632.
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criminalization of morphed child pornography. While Ferber recognized that the harm of
child pornography goes beyond sexual abuse, those extended harms caused by circulation
and possession are still connected to the sexual abuse of children. 234 Therefore, if the
extended harms of child pornography are unconnected to actual sexual abuse of children,
do the justifications also drop away? 235
The Osborne Court was the first to describe a harm more attenuated than physical
sexual abuse. Osborne reasoned that possession of child pornography caused harm
because the evidence showed that pedophiles used it to seduce other children.236 This new
argument untethered the harm caused by child pornography from the foundational harm
of sexual abuse and pointed toward a harm tied to the potential abuse of children through
pornographic seduction.237 In other words, the harm of child pornography was not
connected only to the creation of child pornography but also to its mere existence. 238
However, Ashcroft attempted to retie the knot between child pornography and child sexual
abuse. The Ashcroft Court rejected criminalizing virtual child pornography by quashing
WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V FRQWHQWLRQ WKDW WKHVH LPDJHV PLJKW EH XVHG WR HQFRXUDJH FKLOGUHQ WR
engage in sexual activity, that they might whet the appetites of pedophiles, and that they
might increase the market for actual child pornography. 239 While protecting children from
sexual abuse is a valid use of the law, Ashcroft VWDWHG WKDW ³>W@KH SURVSHFW RI FULPH
however, by itself does not justify laws suppressing proWHFWHGVSHHFK´240
Yet, Ashcroft did not totally dismiss the potential harm caused by morphed child
SRUQRJUDSK\E\VWDWLQJWKDWWKHVHLPDJHV³LPSOLFDWHWKHLQWHUHVWVRIUHDOFKLOGUHQDQGDUH
in that sense closer to the images in Ferber´241 This announcement from the Supreme
Court shows a strong federal belief that morphed images do in fact harm the interests of
children. And here, caught between traditional images of child pornography (which are
the product of sexual violence against children) and virtual child pornography (which
involve no actual sexual violence against children), morphed child pornography poses a
unique analytical problem.242
The federal circuit courts, leaning on Ashcroft¶V GLFWD HPEUDFHG D YLHZ WKDW
morphed child pornography does cause harm and is worthy of inclusion in the law.243 The
Ninth Circuit held in Bach that morphed images harm the psychological well-being of
FKLOGUHQ DQG WKXV LPSOLFDWH WKH ³LQWHUHVWV RI UHDO FKLOGUHQ´ 244 Hotaling noted the
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245. Hotaling, 634 F.3d at 730.
246. Shoemaker, 730 F.3d at 786.
247. Boland, 698 F.3d at 881.
248. See, e.g., Shoemaker, 730 F.3d at 786; Boland, 698 F.3d at 884; Hotaling, 634 F.3d at 730; Bach, 400
F.3d at 632; Leary, supra note 230, at 133.
249. Shoemaker, 730 F.3d at 786.
250. GILLESPIE, supra note 22, at 3.
251. Suzanne Ost, Criminalising Fabricated Images of Child Pornography: A Matter of Harm or Morality?,
30 LEGAL STUD. 230, 241 (2010).
252. Id.
253. OST, supra note 47, at 119; see also Boland, 698 F.3d at 884.
254. GILLESPIE, supra note 22, at 100.
255. G.A. Res. 44/25, Convention on the Rights of the Child (Sept. 2, 1990).
256. Id.
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exploitive nature and reputational harm triggered by morphed images. 245 Shoemaker
highlighted the sexual exploitation, psychological harm, and reputational harm that
morphed child pornography imposes on children. 246 Boland even comments on the
³SULYDF\LQMXULHV´VWHPPLQJIURPPRUSKHGLmages.247 However, no singular theory of the
harm caused by morphed child pornography has been established. While the central harm
of actual sexual abuse is not implicated by morphed images, the other harms noted by the
federal courts are plentiful. And still, the circuit courts boldly utilize these harms,
unconnected to actual sexual abuse, as a justification to include morphed images in the
federal definition of child pornography. 248
Shoemaker GHVFULEHG WKH KDUP SRVHG E\ PRUSKHG FKLOG SRUQRJUDSK\ DV ³VH[XDO
e[SORLWDWLRQ´249 While it is certainly true that morphed images are those which only make
it appear DVWKRXJKWKHFKLOGLVHQJDJLQJLQVH[XDODFWLYLW\LWLV³UHDOLVWLFWRVD\WKDWWKH\
KDYHEHHQH[SORLWHG´250 This exploitation causes psychological harm to a child with the
knowledge that their image was used as an instrument of sexual gratification. 251 It is
LPSRVVLEOHWRTXDQWLI\WKHFRQVHTXHQFHVRQDFKLOG¶VPHQWDOKHDOWKZKHQWKH\NQRZWKDW
a pedophile is using their image as masturbatory material. Even if some victims of
morphed child pornography are unaware that their photo is being manipulated for a
SHGRSKLOH¶VVH[XDOSOHDVXUHWKHWKUHDWDORQHMXVWLILHVFULPLQDOL]LQJPRUSKHGLPDJHV 252
Furthermore, the harms produced by this sexual exploitation are not limited to the
psychological. Whether or not a child becomes aware that their face and/or body is the
VXEMHFWRIDSHGRSKLOH¶VVH[XDOIDQWDVLHVPRUSKHGFKLOGSRUQRJUDSK\FDXVHVKDUPEHFDXVH
the pornographer is taking unfair advantage of a child, using them as D ³PHDQV WR DQ
HQG´253 This exploitative harm violates sexual autonomy and personhood. 254
This distinction between the harms of sexual abuse and sexual exploitation was
acknowledged on the international level. Article 34 of the UN Convention on the Right of
tKH&KLOGHQFRXUDJHVQDWLRQVWR³SURWHFWWKHFKLOGIURPDOOIRUPVRIVH[XDOH[SORLWDWLRQ
DQG VH[XDO DEXVH´255 1RWLFH WKDW WKH $UWLFOH GLVWLQJXLVKHV EHWZHHQ ³H[SORLWDWLRQ´ DQG
³DEXVH´256 This distinction supports the argument that morphed child pornography is
harmful, and worthy of inclusion in Oklahoma law, because of the exploitation of the
children who are used to create these pornographic images. It is this exploitation and the
harms which ensue that are consistently mentioned in the federal circuit courts.
However, some commentators have rejected the justification of these types of harm,
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257. Hessick, supra note 237, at 58.
258. Id. at 70±72.
259. See id. at 73.
260. Id., at 67.
261. Mary Graw Leary, Sexting or Self-Produced Child-Pornography? The Dialog Continues – Structured
Prosecutorial Discretion Within a Multidisciplinary Response, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL¶Y & L. 486, 522 (2010).
262. United States v. Hotaling, 634 F.3d 725, 727 (2nd Cir. 2011).
263. Id.; People v. Gerber, 196 Cal. App. 4th 368, 373 (2011); Parker v. State, 81 So. 3d 451, 452 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2011); State v. Zidel, 940 A.2d 255, 256 (N.H. 2008).
264. Katherine Williams, Child Pornography Law: Does It Protect Children?, 26 J. SOC. WELFARE & FAM.
L. 245, 253 (2011).
265. Id.
266. GILLESPIE, supra note 22, at 41.
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VWDWLQJWKDW³>W@KHLGHDWKDWFKLOGSRUQRJUDSK\FRXOGEHGHILQHGWRLQFOXGHLPDJHVWKDWZHUH
FUHDWHGZLWKRXWKDUPLQJFKLOGUHQVKRXOGJLYHXVSDXVH´ 257 However, this commentaWRU¶V
focus is primarily on sexting images and not morphed images. 258 Still, without a direct
link between the morphed images and the sexual abuse of children, some have defended
excluding morphed images from the category of child pornography. 259 Relying on harm
of actual sexual abuse, it is possible to believe that the other harms implicated by morphed
child pornography are not sufficient and are unconnected to sexual abuse at the time of
production to render these images illegal. 260 Nevertheless, a disconnection between
morphed images and sexual child abuse does not negate the harms of sexual exploitation,
potential psychological harm, or the possible reputational harm used by the many federal
courts previously mentioned. While these harms are certainly different than the one
connected to other types of child pornography, simply saying that the link is weak does
not effectively render the argument void. 261
Furthermore, while the link between morphed child pornography and child sexual
abuse is more attenuated than traditional child pornography, it is certainly more associated
than the virtual child pornography discussed in Ashcroft. Morphed images, as the Hotaling
GHIHQGDQW DGPLWWHG UHFRUG WKH ³PHQWDO IDQWDVLHV´ RI SHGRSKLOHV 262 Often the young
victims of these mental fantasies are children in direct contact with the pedophile. More
than half of the cases previously discussed in this article expose direct connections
EHWZHHQWKHYLFWLPDQGWKHSRUQRJUDSKHULQFOXGLQJDIDWKHUDQGGDXJKWHU¶VIULHQGVDFDmp
photographer and camp students, a Sunday school teacher and Sunday school students,
and a father and daughter.263 The mental fantasies of pedophiles in morphed child
pornography visually represent a lust for children known by the pornographer. Therefore,
the sexual exploitation involved in morphed child pornography is eerily intimate in nature.
Another minority view espouses a beneficial purpose to morphed child pornography
because these images could potentially help pedophiles facilitate an outlet for their disease,
protecting real children from sexual abuse. 264 Here the notion of harm is flipped, and it is
argued that these images might actually lead to less harm. 265 However, there is little
evidence that this is correct.266 Additionally, this argument is severely flawed. Because
virtual child pornography is not illegal, the hypothetically positive effects could be realized
with images of computer-generated children, not actual children with real interests to
protect. As a result, none of these counter-arguments are convincing and the case for
LQFOXGLQJPRUSKHGFKLOGSRUQRJUDSK\LQ2NODKRPD¶VVWDWXWRU\GHILQLWLRQUHPDLQVVWURQJ
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267. Audrey Rogers, The Dignitary Harm of Child Pornography—From Producers to Possessors, in REFINING
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAW: CRIME, LANGUAGE, AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 165, 166 (Carissa Byrne Hessick
ed., 2016).
268. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 n.10 (1982).
269. Rogers, supra note 267, at 177.
270. Id.; Ost, supra note 251, at 241.
271. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759 n.10.
272. O¶DONNELL & MILNER, supra note 6, at 74.
273. OST, supra note 47, at 105.
274. Rogers, supra note 267, at 177.
275. Id.; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 13, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
276. Nat¶l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 170 (2004); Rogers, supra note 267, at 178.
277. Favish, 541 U.S. at 169; Rogers, supra note 267, at 178.
278. OST, supra note 47, at 128.

42010-tul_55-2 Sheet No. 94 Side B

0RUSKHG FKLOG SRUQRJUDSK\ ³YLRODWHV WKH SULYDF\ DQG GLJQLW\ RI WKH GHSLFWHG
FKLOG´267 Therefore, to legalize morphed child pornography would be to legalize the
violation of fundamental human rights and autonomy. Perhaps this is why Ferber noted
WKDW³SRUQRJUDSK\SRVHVDQHYHQJUHDWHUWKUHDWWRWKHFKLOGYLFWLPWKDQGRHVVH[XDODEXVH
or proVWLWXWLRQ´268 Children in morphed child pornography suffer an injury beyond
physical or psychological harm. 269 ³(YHQLIWKHFKLOGZDVXQDZDUHWKHLPDJHZDVPDGH
RU FLUFXODWHG WKRVH ZKR FUHDWH WUDGH DQG YLHZ FKLOG SRUQRJUDSK\ KDUP WKH FKLOG¶V
inherent right RIKXPDQGLJQLW\´²the freedom to not be viewed in such a sexualized and
vulnerable position.270 This idea is related to Ferber ORJLF ZKLFK DFNQRZOHGJHG ³WKH
LQGLYLGXDOLQWHUHVWLQDYRLGLQJGLVFORVXUHRISHUVRQDOPDWWHUV´271
This argument is consistent with the logical division between adult pornography and
child pornography. As previously mentioned, lack of consent plays a significant role in the
understanding of child pornography. In traditional child pornography the child has not²
and cannot²consent to sexual activity. In morphed child pornography, the child has not²
and cannot²consent to their sexualization in order to gratify the sexual appetites of adults.
7KLVFRQVXPSWLRQRIFKLOGSRUQRJUDSK\FDQFDOORXVDSHUVRQWRWKHKDUP³FDXVHGWRDFKLOG
and encouraJHVDYLHZRIFKLOGUHQDVOHJLWLPDWHVH[XDOREMHFWV´272 Objectifying children
to satisfy the desires of adults can only encourage those who commit actual child sexual
abuse.273
Furthermore, humans share an inherent interest in protecting their likeness from
improper use, an interest which is also found in other areas of the law. 274 The Geneva
Convention bans photographs of prisoners of war that subject them to humiliation or public
curiosity.275 The Supreme Court ruled that there is a right of privacy over death-scene
images of a loved one.276 Even tort law limits images of certain death and autopsy
photos.277 This interest in protecting private images applies to children, who have a right
QRWWREH³GHIDPHG´IXUWKHUEROVWHULQJWKHLQFOXVLRQRIPRUSKHGLPDJHVLQ2NODKRPD¶V
definition of child pornography. 278
These notions of human dignity and privacy are also implicated in the current
GLVFXVVLRQ UHJDUGLQJ ³GHHSIDNH´ SRUQRJUDSK\ ZKLFK PXFK OLNH PRUSKHG FKLOG
pornography, embeds the faces of innocent women onto adult actors in pornography
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videos.279 $VRQHYLFWLPRID³GHHSIDNH´SRUQYLGHRGLVFORVHG³,IHHOYLRODWHG²this icky
NLQGRIYLRODWLRQ´280 A Washington Post article states that these pornographic materials
DUH ³ZHDSRQL]HG´ DJDLQVW ZRPHQ FDXVLQJ ³KXPLOLDWLRQ KDUDVVPHQW DQG DEXVH´281
6FDUOHWW -RKDQVVRQ D SURPLQHQW DFWUHVV DQG YLFWLP RI ³GHHSIDNH´ SRUQRJUDSKLF YLGHRV
VSHDNVWRWKHGHSWKRIWKH³GHHSIDNH´SUREOHPE\VWDWLQJWKDW³QRWKLQJFDQVWRSVRPHRQH
IURPFXWWLQJDQGSDVWLQJP\LPDJHRUDQ\RQHHOVH¶VRQWRDGLIIHUHQW body and making it
look as eerily realistic as desired . . . . [T]rying to protect yourself from the Internet and its
GHSUDYLW\LVEDVLFDOO\DORVWFDXVH´282 But Ms. Johansson is wrong. At the federal level,
children are protected from this type of violation of human dignity because legal
definitions of child pornography include morphed images. However, without including
morphed child pornography in the definition of child pornography, attempting to protect
children from this type of abuse, as Ms. Johansson laments, is a lost cause.
C. Morphed Child Pornography Is Repugnant to Public Policy
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279. Drew Harwell, Fake-Porn Videos Are Being Weaponized to Harass and Humiliate Women: “Everybody
is
Potentially
a
Target”,
WASH.
POST
(Dec.
30,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/12/30/fake-porn-videos-are-being-weaponized-harasshumiliate-women-everybody-is-potential-target/?utm_term=.0f96de6b8c91.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. GILLESPIE, supra note 22, at 9; Williams, supra note 264, at 255.
284. NORMAN GEISLER & FRANK TUREK, LEGISLATING MORALITY: IS IT WISE? IS IT LEGAL? IS IT POSSIBLE?
18 (1998).
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 23.
288. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982).
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Perhaps the reason the federal circuit courts have so diligently affirmed the federal
definition of child pornography is the desire to protect children from something blatantly
repugnant. Whether it is this unspoken rationale, or a stand-alone justification, the moral
and ethical connections to morphed child pornography impact public policy. In fact,
England and Wales have a strong moral rationale behind their child pornography
legislation.283 Some scholars have noted the direct link between morality and the law, 284
even stating that the American Revolution was fueled by many things including the belief
³WKDWWKHNLQJRI%ULWDLQZDVQRWOHJLVODWLQJPRUDOO\´ 285 The belief was that the king acted
unfairly, violating human rights.286 As a practical example, the Thirteenth Amendment is
an instance when the government took a moral stand by banning slavery. 287
The idea that children should be protected from sexualization is consistent with
deeply-rooted public policy. Certainly, the moral fabric of American society demands the
protection of children from people who would abuse them. The prevention of sexual
exploitation of children constitutes an objective of surpassing importance. 288 Child
pornography laws themselves reveal this strongly held desire to guard the most precious
and vulnerable persons in society.
+RZHYHU VRPH DVVHUW WKDW ³>S@URVHFXWLQJ LQGLYLGXDOV IRU LPDJHV WKDW DUH FUHDWHG
without abusing or exploiting a child transforms child pornography law into a system for
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HQIRUFLQJ SRSXODU PRUDOLW\´289 Others disagree completely.290 One commentator even
stated that morality is an appropriate foundation for banning these images. 291 Therefore,
LPPRUDOEHKDYLRU³HYHQWKDWZKLFKRFFXUVLQSULYDWH, poses a threat to the moral fiber of
VRFLHW\DQGFRQVHTXHQWO\VRFLHW\LWVHOI´292
But public policy and strong convictions without meaningful representation in the
law is of little value. It is one thing to believe that children should not be exploited by
pedophiles, but it is another for the law to add meaningful weight behind this conviction.
The harms caused by morphed child pornography accentuate the need to protect children.
Sexual exploitation, psychological harm, and violations of human dignity and privacy
FDQQRWEHWROHUDWHGLQDVRFLHW\WKDWKROGVKLJKO\WKH³VDFUHGWUXVW´RISURWHFWLQJWKHPRVW
vulnerable and defenseless in society.293 Public policy, undergirded by strong moral
convictions, properly calls for the inclusion of morphed child pornography in Oklahoma
law.
VI. CONCLUSION

–Caleb Beacham*
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289. Hessick, supra note 237, at 73.
290. Williams, supra note 264, at 254.
291. Id. (³[T]he reasoning for the law must fall back on the protection of sexual morality; the desire to prevent
people obtaining sexual gratification, even if it does not interfere with the rights of children (especially in the
case of pseudo-images, where children are not used in the creation of the image), merely because most people
consider that viewing such images is abhorrent.´).
292. OST, supra note 47, at 120.
293. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757.
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With the constitutional issues previously handled at the federal level, the good
people of Oklahoma have the right to protect their children from pornographers who
exploit children by including in their statute a definition of child pornography that
incorporates morphed child pornography. Because morphed child pornography is not
LQFOXGHGLQ2NODKRPD¶VGHILQLWLRQRIFKLOGSRUQRJUDSK\DQGEHFDXVHLWVKDUPIXOHIIHFWV
are worthy of prosecution, the Oklahoma legislature should update state law to protect
children. The legislature can adopt language from either the current federal statute or reach
back into Oklahoma legislative history and use the language that previously defined
obscenity before it was changed.
With the intent to protect children from the harms of morphed child pornography,
and in light of our deeply-rooted value in protecting children, the new statute should define
FKLOGSRUQRJUDSK\DV³DQ\YLVXDOGHSLFWLRQ . . wherein a minor under the age of eighteen
(18) yHDUVLVHQJDJHGRUDSSHDUVWREHHQJDJHGLQDQ\VH[XDODFWLYLW\´

